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1.1. Main objectives and structure of the thesis 
 
On 7th June 2011 Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway 
met in Oslo for exchange of ratification protocols.1 It makes Treaty between Norway and 
Russia concerning delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean 
entered into force and binding.2 The Treaty plays important role for development of 
different industry sectors in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean regions, and, first of all, 
oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation. It is not a novel to include in delimitation 
agreements provisions regulating oil and gas deposits which can appear in a border region 
and become a stumbling block for neighboring States. The remarkable feature of this treaty 
is that, besides standard article regulating transboundary deposits, it contains whole annex 
describing in detail procedure of establishing cooperative regime.3 This procedure is not a 
new as well, being used more or less widely, but appearance of such an annex in a 
delimitation agreement arises some legal questions. One of them is to what degree the 
practice to cooperate in the field of transboundary oil and natural gas deposits is 
recognized by States? 
 
In its judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf 4 cases the International Court of Justice 
expressed main problem arising in case of transboundary resources, the same deposit lying 
on both sides of the line dividing a continental shelf between States. The problem is that 
given the fact that it is possible to exploit such deposit from either side, it can lead to 
prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or the other of the interested States.5 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2011/maritie_delimitation.html?id=646614 
 [visited 17.08.2011]. 
2 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk,15 September 2010. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/SMK/Vedlegg/2010/avtale_engelsk.pdf [visited 17.08.2011]. 
3 Ibid., annex II, “Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits”. 
4 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (FRG/Den., FRG/Neth.)., ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3. 
5 Ibid., para. 97. 
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The importance of present topic can be supported by the following facts. An economical 
development of any State depends strongly on natural resources at its disposal. The oil and 
natural gas resources, being relatively cheap and widely used energy source, play very 
important role in it. While those resources that are at the undisputed disposal of states are 
not a subject of a big concern, these of transboundary nature present one of the most 
controversial and less developed issues. The land frontiers is clearly established almost 
everywhere, but the continental shelf delimitation has less than a hundred years history 
and, therefore attracts much more attention.  
 
In the present analysis two questions with regard to transboundary hydrocarbon resources 
are considered. The first is how shall neighboring states act in case when oil and natural 
gas resources cross the border delimiting their continental shelf and what a legal basis for 
such actions? For this purpose the next subchapter considers the notion and classification 
of transboundary resources in general. Chapter II makes short overview of the historical 
development of the law regulating using of the resources falling under this definition.  
 
The third chapter deals particularly with oil and natural gas resources. To decide what law 
shall be applicable to that problem it is necessary look in the article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice,6 which provides the list of the sources of international law. 
For the purpose of the present analysis they can be divided in three groups of sources of 
international law. All of them will be considered below one by one.  
 
The subchapter 3.3 deals with the first group including widely recognized international 
legal instruments regulating common hydrocarbon resources. Here focus is made on two 
international instruments. The first of them is the UN LOS Convention,7 the core element 
of the Law of the Sea. The second one is the work of ILC on the topic “Shared natural 
resources”, shared oil and gas in particular, which was aiming to adopt international legal 
instrument to regulate this issue, as it was made by it for transboundary aquifers.  The 
second group being considered in subchapter 3.4 considers international custom and 
general principles arising from states practice on this issue, particularly, from bilateral 
agreements between them. Here special attention is paid to cross-border unitization and 
                                                 
6 Statute of the International Court of Justice. Adopted June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 105,  article 38. 
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay, 10 December 1982. 1833 UNTS 3. 
Hereinafter UN LOSC. 
3 
 
joint development agreements getting increasing acceptance worldwide. And the last, third, 
group, in subchapter 3.5, takes into consideration judgments in cases, mostly delimitation 
disputes, brought before international tribunals, the ICJ in particular.  
 
This analysis shows that the most reasonable and widely accepted solution of the 
transboundary resources problem is the cooperation between the neighboring states.8  
 
Because of that and the fact that attempts to adopt comprehensive legal instrument 
regulating transboundary hydrocarbons have failed, the second question of the present 
paper arises whether the obligation to cooperate is already an international customary rule. 
The chapter IV trying to answer this question also considers international law sources of 
different levels. And some conclusive remarks at the end of the paper finalize analysis of 
the questions posed.  
 
Pursuing the main goals of the present work, a basic method used was the method of 
analysis of legal sources of international law as it was described above. In analysis of the 
sources of international law, descriptive and analytical methods were applied.  
 
1.2. Definition and classification of transboundary resources 
 
For the purpose of this paper, a scope of transboundary natural resources has to be defined. 
Along with term ‘transboundary natural resources’ this type of natural resources is also 
called as a ‘common’ or ’shared natural resources’. The latter is widely used by ILC in its 
work on the law of transboundary aquifers and hydrocarbons resources. In accordance with 
some opinions the term ‘transboundary’ is more appropriate than ‘shared’. Using word 
transboundary it describes the state of the resource itself. It is accurate and precise in 
denoting a thing which traverses a boundary, while the word ‘shared’ speaks about the 
actions and attitudes of parties with respect to the resource (i.e. ‘sharing’).9 It is also argued 
that “even accepting the inevitable natural unity of a given deposit of resources, the 
sovereignty of a State over its territory and natural wealth cannot be fragmented, much less 
                                                 
8 Hereinafter, by “cooperation” and “general obligation to cooperate” is meant cooperation in the field of 
exploration and exploitation of transboundary natural resources. 
9 Beyene, Zewdineh and Wadley, Ian L.G. Common goods and the common good: Transboundary natural 
resources, principled cooperation, and the Nile Basin Initiative. Berkeley, UC Berkeley: Center for African 
Studies 2004. (Breslauer Symposium on Natural Resource Issues in Africa;), at 4. 
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shared”.10 Even when states cooperate, mostly because of economic or ecological reasons, 
with its neighbors for exploration and exploitation of transboundary resources, such 
resources may be regarded as shared from a purely physical, natural, or ecological point of 
view, but not from a legal one.11 That’s why “transboundary” is the most correct describing 
of such resources, but in the present work term “shared”, “common” and some others are 
used as well, being equal to the “transboundary” for the purpose of the thesis.  
 
There is no single definition of the term “transboundary natural resources” and debates 
about what should be included in that notion is still going on.12 But two inherent 
geographical features of it can be outlined: (1) two or more States have access to the same 
resource and (2) activities by one State have an impact on the capability of the other to use 
the resource. Resources may be transboundary either when their deposit is divided by a 
boundary, for instance, gold or timber, or when they straddle from one side of the border to 
the other, e.g. oil, natural gas, straddling fish stocks and other migratory species.13 
Boundaries transecting natural resources may involve as the boundaries between the two 
States as, in case of maritime boundaries, that between State’s territorial sea or EEZ and 
the high sea, which is legally open to the community of States as a whole, or between 
States continental shelf and international seabed area, which is reserved for mankind as a 
part of its common heritage.14 Those resources that cross intrastate border also fall under 
the notion of transboundary resources, but in the present work only those that affect 
interstate border will be considered.  
 
It is also worth to make a simple classification of transboundary natural resources. First of 
all, such resources contain as living as non-living natural resources. This division doesn’t 
                                                 
10 Szekely, Alberto. International Law of Submarine Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources: Legal Limits 
to Behavior and Experiences for the Gulf of Mexico. In: Nat. Resources J. Vol. 26 (1986), pp. 733-768, at 
735-736. 
11 Ibid. 
12 On example see Co-operation in the field of the environment concerning natural resources shared by two 
or more States. Report of the Executive Director. UN Environment Programme. UN Doc. UNEP/GC/44 
(1975) para. 86; Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared by 
Two or More States on the Work of its Fifth Session, UN Environment Programme. UN Doc. UNEP/IG.12/2 
(1978) para. 16; Adede, A.O. United Nations Efforts toward the Development of an Environmental Code of 
Conduct for States  Concerning Harmonious Utilization of Shared Natural Resources. In: Albany Law 
Review. Vol. 43 (1978-1979), pp. 488-512 
13 Matz-Lück, Nele. The Benefits of Positivism: The ILC’s Contribution to the Peaceful Sharing of 
Transboundary Groundwater. In: Peace through International Law. (Springer Dordrecht, Heidelberg, 
London, New York) 2009, pp. 125-150, at 130. 
14 Szekely, supra note 10, at 736. 
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need detailed consideration. In turn, category of non-living resources is divided in two 
groups, mobile and static. Mobile transboundary resources can be described as “a natural 
resource which is not only transected by a national frontier, but which is capable of 
traversing that frontier by virtue of its state of flux”.15 Static resources are not mobile ones, 
such as gold, timber and diamonds. Some commentators argue necessity to distinguish 
between mobile and static natural resources by “the physical properties of static natural 
resources […] and the processes required for their extraction and commercial 
exploitation”, concluding that “static natural resources present a relatively ‘easy case’, 
which may be resolved with reference to the boundary line agreed between two disputing 
parties or established through judicial determination” unlike ‘hard case’ of mobile 
transboundary natural resources.16 
                                                 
15 Beyene and Wadley, supra note 9, at 3. 











Since law of oil and gas transboundary resources is not well developed yet it is worth to 
consider other kinds of transboundary resources and legal regime of their management. In 
this chapter history of state’s concern about transboundary resources is presented, starting 
from early XIX century. Here, not only hydrocarbons, but almost all kind of resources 
falling within the scope of notion and classification described in chapter 1.2., are 
considered. The basic principles arose from their regimes can be applicable for oil and gas 
resources as well. 
 
2.2. First attempts of legal regulation of transboundary resource: international 
watercourses 
 
The first international community’s concerns about transboundary natural resources relates 
to transboundary rivers.  A number of bilateral and multilateral arrangements emerged in 
Europe in the late XVIII and early XIX century.17 The earliest arrangements regulated only 
navigational use of international rivers and were at first almost totally concerned with the 
rights of the freedom of navigation.18  
 
The 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers19 was one 
of the first attempts to regulate non-navigational uses of transboundary rivers. In 1970 UN 
                                                 
17 The 1804 Convention between French and German Empires dealt with the Rhine River is, probably, the 
first of the bilateral ones.  The first multilateral consideration of the transboundary rivers’ legal status took 
place in the Congress of Vienna in 1815. And the Danube Commission established in 1856 is the earliest 
example of modern international organization in this field. 
18See Schrijver, Nico. Sovereignty over natural resources. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1997;  
Beyene and Wadley, supra note 9;  Yamada, Chusei. Shared natural resources: first report on outlines. Doc. 
A/CN.4/533  
19 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers. ILA Report of the Fifty-second 
Conference, Helsinki, 1966 (London, 1967).  
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General Assembly in its Resolution 2669 (XXV) recommended that “International Law 
Commission should […] take up the study of the law of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses”.20 The ILC work on this issue started in 1971 and continued 
until 1994 when final draft articles were presented to General Assembly. And in 1997, by a 
vote of 104 to 3, with 26 abstentions, the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses was adopted, but still has not entered into force due to 
lack of ratifications. 21  Part II of the Convention sets up the general principles: (1) 
equitable and reasonable utilization and participation and, (2) obligation not cause 
significant harm, and (3) general obligation to cooperate.22 These principles can be applied 
to the issue of transboundary oil and natural gas resources by analogy. 
 
2.3. Legal regime of the natural resources shared by two or more States 
2.3.1. The first mentions of the problem of transboundary natural resources at 
international level 
 
The 1972 Stockholm United Nations Conference on the Human Environment has attracted 
international attention to the need to elaborate a general legal regime for transboundary 
resources,23 but no substantive paragraph on shared resources was included in the UN 
Declaration on the Human Environment, because of serious differences of opinion 
between, for instance, between Argentina and Brazil, on the issue of using of La Plata river 
basin for a Brazilian hydroelectric project.24 
 
In September 1973 the Economic Declaration adopted by the Fourth Conference of Heads 
of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers denoted importance to 
develop an effective system of co-operation for the conservation and exploitation of natural 
resources shared by two or more States.25 And already in December of the same year 
                                                 
20UN GA Resolution 2669 (XXV). Progressive development and codification of the rules of international 
law relating to international watercourses. 1920th plenary meeting, 8 December 1970  
21Convention on the law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Adopted by the UNGA 
Resolution 51/229 on 21 May 1997); see also A/CN.4/533, supra note18; Beyene and Wadley, supra note 9. 
22 Ibid., articles 5-8. 
23 Szekely, supra note 10, at 736-737. 
24 Schrijver, supra note 18, at 130 
25 Ibid., at 131 
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General Assembly adopted Resolution 3129 (XXVIII) emphasizing necessity “to ensure 
effective cooperation between countries through the establishment of adequate 
international standards for the conservation and harmonious exploitation of natural 
resources common to two or more States in the context of the normal relations existing 
between them”,26 and mandating the Governing Council of UNEP to formulate such 
standards, including a system of prior information and consultation.27  
 
But the contrast of views on this issue still remained. The illustrative example of that is the 
Article 3 of the 1974 UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States providing for: 
In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries, each State 
must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and prior consultations in order 
to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the legitimate 
interest of others. 28 
 
The sensitivity and disagreement involved, especially amongst developing countries, was 
reflected in the voting record on Article 3: 100 votes to eight, with twenty-eight 
abstentions. It was the only example of an article or part thereof being adopted with more 
than seventeen abstentions.29 
 
2.3.2. UNEP Principles for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious 
Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States30 
 
Pursuant to the Resolution 3129 mentioned above a Working Group of legal experts was 
established under auspices of UNEP and met several times between 1976 and 1978 to 
develop Principles on Shared Natural Resources. The Principles were drawn up for the 
guidance of States with respect to conservation and harmonious utilization of natural 
resources shared by two or more States and presented to the UNEP Governing Council for 
consideration and approval. The latter in its report on the work of its sixth session 
                                                 
26 UN GA Resolution 3129 (XXVIII). Co-operation in the field of the environment concerning natural 
resources shared by two or more States. 2199th plenary meeting, 13 December 1973. 
27 See Schrijver, supra note 18; and Adede, supra note 12. 
28 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (adopted by UN GA Resolution 3281(XXIX), 12 
December 1974, UN Doc. A/Res/29/3281), article 3. 
29 Schrijver, supra note 18, at 110  
30 Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation 
and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States (adopted by the Governing 




represented controversial opinions of delegations.31 The basic question arose is whether or 
not binding nature of Principles depended only on incorporation into future bilateral or 
multilateral treaties.32 Some delegations expressed their opinion that “the principle of 
permanent, absolute and exclusive sovereignty of States over their natural resources was 
clearly recognized in international law; the work of the Group must therefore be seen as in 
no way prejudging that sovereignty”.33 Analyzing all opinions, the main question was: “Do 
the principles as adopted have an intrinsic value which would permit their use as a basis for 
development of uniform or at least parallel legislation in various states, or are they devoid 
of such value, depending solely on incorporation into legally binding instruments?” The 
latter view clearly prevailed.34  
 
Finally, the UNEP Principles were adopted and transmitted to the General Assembly, 
which had mandated UNEP to undertake this project. In its Resolution 34/186 the former 
requested States: 
to use the principles as guidelines and recommendations in the formulation of bilateral 
or multilateral conventions regarding natural resources shared by two or more States, 
on the basis of the principle of good faith and in the spirit of good neighborliness and 
in such a way as to enhance and not adversely affect development and the interests of 
all countries, in particular the developing countries.35 
 
According to the Principles, it is necessary that States co-operate with a view to 
controlling, preventing, reducing, or eliminating adverse environmental effects that may 
result from the utilization of resources shared by two or more States consistently with the 
concept of equitable utilization of shared natural resources. Such co-operation is to take 
place on an equal footing, taking into account the sovereignty, rights, and interests of the 
States concerned.36  
 
The fact that the Principles is only of recommendatory character indicates that at the time 
of their adoption considerable resistance to the development of such international 
environmental law still existed.37 
                                                 
31  See Report of the Governing Council on the work of its sixth session. UN Environment Programme.  UN 
Doc. A/33/25. 
32 Adede, supra note 12, at 510. 
33 Ibid., at 511 (referring A/33/25, supra  note 30).  
34 Ibid., at 511. 
35 UN GA Resolution 34/186. Co-operation in the field of the environment concerning natural resources 
shared by two or more States. 107th plenary meeting, 18 December 1979. 
36 Shared Resources: Issues of Governance. Edited by Hart, Sharelle. Gland, (IUCN) 2008, at 22. 




2.3.3. 1982 UN LOS Convention and 1995 UN Fish Stock Agreement  
 
Several provisions of the LOS Convention deal with the issue of transboundary resources. 
Article 63 relates to fish stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones of two or 
more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and 
adjacent to it, and establishes a duty to seek to agree upon the measures necessary to 
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks. Containing the 
wording “without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part”38 it does not affect the 
property rights of coastal State over the part of the resources inside its zone of marine 
jurisdiction. Article 64 deals with highly migratory species and provides for basically the 
same duty as Article 63 does. Articles 66 and 67 deal with anadromous and catadromous 
species respectively which can be of transboundary nature as well. It is worth to note that 
all four articles preserve the sovereign rights of the coastal State over resources.  
 
Developing the idea of regulation of transboundary marine living resources, the UN Fish 
Stock Agreement39 was concluded in 1995. It sets out principles for the conservation and 
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The Agreement elaborates on 
the fundamental principles, such as the precautionary approach, the best available scientific 
information and the cooperation to ensure conservation and to promote the optimum 
utilization of fisheries resources.  
 
It is remarkable that LOSC being result of almost 10 years negotiations and supposed to 
establish a comprehensive regime for the Sea, neglects the issue of transboundary 
hydrocarbon resources, besides article 142 restricted to the issue of resource deposits 
crossing border between the Area and Continental Shelf of a coastal State. It is all the more 
surprising that five years before the beginning of substantive negotiations at the UNCLOS 
III, the International Court of Justice clearly recognized the problem of such transboundary 
wealth and, more importantly, its legal, economic, and ecological consequences.40 The 
                                                 
38 LOSC, supra note 7, art. 63. 
39 The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 September 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (adopted on September 8th, 1995. UN Doc. A/CONF. 164/37). 
Hereinafter UN FSA. 
40 Szekely, supra note 10, at 741(referring the North Sea cases, supra note 4). 
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issue of the Law of the Sea in connection with transboundary oil and gas resources more 
widely will be considered below in chapter III. 
 
2.3.4. The work of International Law Commission on the topic “Shared natural resources” 
 
At its fifty-second session, in 2000, the International Law Commission included topic 
“Shared natural resources of the States” in its long-term programme of work.41  
 
In 2002 this topic was included on the Programme of work of the Commission, by the 
name of “Shared natural resources”.42 In 2003, it was decided to limit the scope of the 
topic to confined groundwaters, oil and gas, and to begin first with the former.43 
 
The Commission’s work on the issue of confined groundwaters lasted from 2003 until 
2008 and finished with the adoption by ILC of “The draft articles on the law of 
transboundary aquifers”.44 The General Assembly commended them to the attention of 
Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate 
action. 
 
The Draft articles is still non-binding instrument and serves as guidance for States willing 
to accept legal guidance on the co-operative management of shared water resources. In 
general, the transboundary aquifers draft seeks to apply the principles of the 1997 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses45, 
mutatis mutandis, to transboundary groundwater. Indeed, most of the substantive articles in 
the aquifers draft are based on the watercourses articles. The draft articles are intended to 
conform a set of substantive principles of customary international law and environmental 
law, such as the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of aquifers; the obligation 
not to cause significant harm to other aquifer states; the prevention, reduction and control 
of pollution to aquifers and their ecosystems, and of procedural principles deriving from 
                                                 
41 Report on the work of its fifty-second session. UN International Law Commission. UN Doc. A/55/10, para. 
729. 
42 Report on the work of its fifty-fourth session. UN International Law Commission. UN Doc. A/57/10, para. 
518, 519. 
43 A/CN.4/533, supra note 18. 
44 The draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers (adopted by the ILC at its 60th session in 2008), see 
also Yamada, Chusei. Firth report on shared natural resources: transboundary aquifers. Doc. A/CN.4/591 
45 Supra note 21. 
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the general duty of cooperation and relating to management, monitoring and exchange of 
information between aquifer states.46  
 
The work of the Commission on the issue of oil and gas resources will be considered in 
detail in Chapter III below. The only things to note are that it lasted from 2007 until 2010 
and at its sixty-fifth session, the Commission endorsed the recommendation of the 
Working Group, namely “not to take up the consideration of the transboundary oil and gas 
aspects of the topic “Shared natural resources”.47  
 
2.4. Conclusion  
 
The present survey of different attempts to adopt an international legal instrument for 
transboundary resources shows that such resources present a controversial issue. The main 
obstacle to develop binding rules regulating management of transboundary wealth is 
reluctance of several states to compromise on that issue and that they rely on the absolutely 
recognized sovereignty over that part of resources which is located within state’s territory.  
 
But anyway, on the base of the present analysis, some basic principles of states’ behavior 
in case of transboundary resources can be outlined. They are: (1) general obligation to 
cooperate; (2) not to cause significant harm to other parties involved; (3) to inform and 
consult; (4) optimum and reasonable utilization of resources; (5) principles of good faith 
and good neighborliness; and others.  
                                                 
46 See Matz-Lück, Nele, supra note 13; Candioti, Enrique. Commen:International Law of Shared Natural 
Resources and Peace . In: Peace through International Law. (Springer Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New 
York) 2009. pp. 151-155; McCaffrey, Stephen C. The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles 
on Transboundary Aquifers. In: The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 103 (2009), pp. 272-29 . 










The present chapter deals particularly with transboundary oil and natural gas resources. As 
it was mentioned in Chapter I the analysis will consider separate groups of sources of 
international law, three different levels: international regime, bilateral state practice and 
related case law. But before it the definition of transboundary oil and natural gas resources 
will be given and the issue of sovereignty and sovereign rights over transboundary 
hydrocarbon resources, and territorial integrity issue will be overviewed to show how 
topical the present subject is.  
 
The definition of transboundary resources was already considered above. It is broad and 
complicated. For the purposes of the present chapter it is worth to outline the main features 
of the notion of transboundary oil and natural gas resources. First of all, it is a deposit of 
oil or natural gas that lies on the both sides from the border between states or between state 
and a community of states as a whole, and has ability to traverse that border. The second 
element of the definition is that portion of deposit lying on the one side from a border can 
be exploited, wholly or in part, from another side. There are five possible cases when 
hydrocarbon deposits can “cross a border line”: (1) land boundary between two States; (2) 
boundary between States’ continental shelves (almost the same as the previous, but 
distinction should be made because of formal difference between sovereignty and 
sovereign rights); (3) joint development zone, disputed area without defined boundary; (4) 
boundary between State’s continental shelf and international seabed area, the Area; (5) 
boundary between joint development zone and the state’s territory where it exercises 





3.2. Sovereignty, sovereign rights and territorial integrity 
 
The sovereignty of states extends to the mineral resources in the soil and subsoil of their 
land territory and territorial sea to an unlimited depth and doesn’t depend on whether or 
not the deposit has been discovered or the state is able or intends to exploit it. Any other 
state is to get consent of the territorial state for exercising any right over these resources.48 
This also applies to the continental shelf’s mineral resources, though in that case states 
have “exclusive sovereign rights” rather then full territorial sovereignty, but for the 
purpose of exploitation of mineral resources, there is practically no difference between 
these rights.49 Territorial sovereignty and sovereign rights end spatially at the frontiers and 
dividing line of the continental shelf respectively, thus any mineral deposit extending 
across a boundary line is to be divided into physical areas, each of which falls under the 
jurisdiction of the superjacent state. But it is hardly applicable to resolve the problems of 
deposits of liquid minerals, such as oil and natural gas, because, firstly, no state is able to 
determine precise amount of deposit accruing to it without the cooperation with the other 
states involved and, secondly, because of capability of such resources to traverse border 
delimiting it.50 
 
The principle closely relating to the principle of territorial sovereignty is the principle of 
territorial integrity, which implies that territory of a state is inviolable from encroachment 
by other states. Within the subject matter this principle would be violated in two possible 
cases. First, if unwarranted mining is conducted through the boundary line into that part of 
a common deposit on the territory of continental shelf of neighboring state. Second, if 
mining conducted on one side of the boundary caused material damage on the other.51  
 
The rule of state’s responsibility for the material damage to another state’s territory was 
widely developed with regard to extraterritorial environmental effects, and it arguably 
seems to be applicable for the mining operations as well. But establishing of violations of 
the principle of territorial integrity seems to be even more difficult than to resolve the 
                                                 
48 Lagoni, Rainer. Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers. In: The American Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 73(1979), pp. 215-243, at 216. 
49 Ibid., at 216 (referring the North Sea cases, supra note 4). 
50 Ibid., at 216. 
51 Ibid., at 217. 
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problem of the division of authority for common deposits of oil and gas, mostly, because 
these deposits are characterized by a complicated “equilibrium of rock pressure, gas 
pressure and underlying water pressure”.52  
 
It is obviously that any extraction operation of hydrocarbons at one point unavoidably 
changes conditions of the whole deposit. It can result, for instance, in that one state cannot 
extract the minerals from its part of deposit, even if the first state has extracted only that 
portion originally situated in its territory or continental shelf. And without knowing 
geological features of deposit it is difficult to argue that a state has suffered material 
damage from another’s exploitation or to determine the amount of such damage.53  
 
Another problem related to a violation of the territorial integrity derives from the fact that 
mining operations are usually performs by private companies, getting right to it from the 
state owning mineral resources. In case of material damage caused by that company to the 
territory of another states, licensing state is responsible, in accordance with international 
law, only if and when it has known or should have known that its territory would be used 
to infringe on the rights of the other state.54 
 
3.3. International legal regime of transboundary hydrocarbon resources 
 
3.3.1. Transboundary oil and natural gas resources and the Law of the Sea 
 
Since the main topic of the present analysis relates to continental shelf which is regulated, 
in general, by the international Law of the Sea, it is strongly necessary to analyze how the 
latter, and its core element the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, regulate 
issue of the transboundary mineral resources. 
 
Articles 82 and 142 are the only articles dealing especially with non-living resources. 
Article 142 refers to “activities in the Area, with respect to resource deposits in the Area 
                                                 
52 Ibid., at 217 (citing Ely. The Conservation of Oil. In: Harv. L. Rev. Vol. 51, at 1219). 
53 Ibid., at 217. 
54 Ibid., at 218. 
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which lie across limits of national jurisdiction”.55 It provides for duty of consultation 
including a system of prior notification. Article 82 deals with payments and contributions 
with respect to the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The 
revenue sharing system established by this provision implies that mankind has a right over 
portion of the resources located on the outer edge of the shelf. Probably, it can even be said 
that this provision turns such resources into these of transboundary nature.56  
 
As it was already said, there is no provision regulating transboundary mineral resources of 
the continental shelf between neighboring States, but it does not mean that those resources 
did not play any role in the negotiations at the UNCLOS III. Concerning preservation of 
the sovereign rights over oil and natural gas resources under their jurisdiction, especially 
those located in close vicinity to the boundaries, the delegations tried to avoid adopting of 
precise provisions regulating such resources. 57 It is not surprising that at the latter stage of 
negotiations the delimitation issue between States with adjacent or opposite coasts was the 
most hard-core issue in the entire proceedings of UNCLOS III. The negotiations ended 
with the adoption of the articles 74 and 83 dealing respectively with the delimitation of the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf and providing a delimitation formula 
which is so vague and contentious as to be virtually worthless. Aroused number of 
delimitation disputes taken to the ICJ at that time is one of the consequences of ambiguity 
and imprecision of these provisions.58 These articles were the main reason why Turkey and 
Venezuela voted against the adoption of the Convention arguing that it did not adequately 
protect claims of named states vis-à-vis their neighbors.59  
 
The provisions of LOSC seem to provide that each State has independent rights to explore 
and exploit its continental shelf resources without regard to other states. However, from 
one point of view “a comprehensive reading of UNCLOS reveals an underlying principle 
of cooperation between the states with regard to the exploration and exploitation of 
common deposits”.60 Both article 74 and article 83 provide for the same provisions, 
                                                 
55 LOSC., supra note 7, article 142. 
56 Szekely, supra note 10, at 740. 
57 Ibid., at 741. 
58 Ibid., at 741-742 (citing Brown. Delimitation of Offshore Areas: Hard Labour and Bitter Fruits at 
UNCLOS III. In: Marine Pol’y. Vol.5 (1981), at 179). 
59 Ibid., at 742. 
60 Urdaneta, Karla. Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs: A Recommended Approach for the United States 
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“Pending agreement […], the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and 
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the 
final agreement”.61 Article 123, dealing with an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, also calls 
for cooperation. More wide consideration of the question whether or not the obligation to 
cooperate in case of transboundary hydrocarbon resources is the customary international 
law will be provided below in Chapter IV.  
 
Summing up the role of LOSC on the present issue one may note that strict interpretation 
of the Convention leads to conclusion that there exists rather a rule of capture than that of 
cooperation. But others argue that LOSC purpose is “to establish a legal framework within 
which the states will cooperate in order to define and exercise their maritime jurisdiction, 
as well as to determine the best use of the shared resources”.62 In support of the latter 
statement, the UN FSA can be mentioned. Although it regulates only living resources of 
transboundary nature, it clearly expresses the idea of cooperation on utilization of 
resources. And its Article 5 states that duty to cooperate ex facte prescribed by the 
Convention.63 
 
3.3.2. The work of the International Law Commission on the topic”Shared natural 
resources” concerning oil and natural gas resources 
 
As it was noted in chapter 2.3.4., International Law Commission dealt with the topic of 
shared natural resources from 2002 until 2010 which was divided in two subtopics: law of 
the transboundary aquifers and that of the transboundary oil and natural gas resources. In 
the present subsection only the latter will be considered. 
 
At its fifty-second session, in 2000, the International Law Commission included topic 
“Shared natural resources of the States” in its long-term programme of work.64 
                                                                                                                                                    
and Mexico in the Deepwaters of the Gulf of Mexico. In: Houston Journal of International Law. Vol. 32 
(2010), pp. 333-392, at 372. 
61 LOSC,  supra note 7, articles 74, 83 (emphasis added). 
62 Urdaneta, supra note 60, at 374. 
63 UN FSA, supra note 39, article 5 states:” In order to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in giving effect to their 
duty to cooperate in accordance with the Convention…”, (emphasis added). 
64A/55/10, supra note 41, para 729. 
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Transboundary oil and natural gas resources were chosen as one of the only two issues 
within shared natural resources topic.65 Due to the fact that the issue of the law of 
transboundary aquifers was chosen as a first to consider the work on topic of oil and gas 
started only in 2007.  
 
In his fourth report,66 in 2007, the Special Rapporteur raised the question of relatedness of 
both subtopics. The work on the draft articles on transboundary aquifers was almost 
completed while the topic of oil and gas resources was not developed at all. Analyzing 
similarities and differences of the two subtopics, it appeared that the latter constitute much 
bigger bulk. The only similarity between groundwaters on one hand and oil and natural gas 
on the other is that the reservoir rock and the natural condition of the oil and natural gas 
stored therein are almost identical to a non-recharging and confined aquifer. In 
contradistinction to groundwaters oil and natural gas are important resources, but are not 
essential for life and there are various alternative resources and the consideration of vital 
human needs does not arise here.67 One of the main differences noted in the report is that 
“the consideration of environmental problems of oil and natural gas requires an entirely 
different approach from that of groundwaters”.68 Nevertheless, appointed Special 
Rapporteur considered that some of the regulations of the law of the non-recharging 
transboundary aquifer might be relevant to the question of oil and natural gas, but 
concluded, finally, that a separate approach is required for the latter.69 
  
At its 59th session, in 2007, the Commission admitted the proposal made by Mr. Yamada 
about separate approach and established a Working Group on Shared natural resources 
which, inter alia, prepared a questionnaire on State practice concerning oil and gas for 
circulation to Governments.70 The questionnaire included five questions about states 
practice and domestic legislation regarding transboundary hydrocarbons.71   
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In their responses the overwhelming majority of the Governments supported the 
Commission suggestion pointing the same reason as these outlined by Mr. Yamada. 
Supporting suggestion made by the Commission the Governments expressed their views 
on the work on oil and natural gas. These views range from support for the initiation of 
work on oil and natural gas by the Commission on a priority basis to opposition to any 
such work.72 In 2009, Mr. Yamada, in his paper on oil and natural gas, summarized these 
views.73 In accordance with them, there exist many bilateral agreements and arrangements 
between the States and between their national oil and gas companies, providing for 
cooperation, exchange of information, effective exploitation, equitable sharing and 
protection of environment as basic principles. There also exist joint mechanisms but they 
are as yet rather informal and embryonic. Several States support the view that the question 
of oil and natural gas is bilateral, highly technical and politically sensitive and that it must 
be dealt with case by case. Therefore they urge the Commission to take a cautious 
approach. The Nordic countries, Mexico and Indonesia stressed the importance of the 
concept of unitization, which implies the consideration of the transboundary oil and natural 
gas field as one unit with a single operator but where earnings and costs are shared.74  
 
In 2010, in his report, the Special Rapporteur, summarized the views of the Member States 
concerning the issue of oil and gas, noting that the majority of them were largely negative. 
There was noted that each case had its own specific and distinct features and need to be 
addressed separately. Therefore doubts were expressed as to the need of any codification 
relating to this issue, including the development of universal rules. It was feared that an 
attempt at generalization might inadvertently lead to additional complexity and confusion 
in an area that had been adequately addressed through bilateral efforts to manage it. 
Finally, Mr. Murase recommends the Working Group to admit that the topic of oil and gas 
will not be pursued any further.75 
 
At its 62nd session in 2010, the Commission decided once more to establish a Working 
Group on Shared natural resources, which finally recommended that the Commission 
should not take up the consideration of the transboundary oil and gas aspects of the 
                                                 
72 A/CN.4/591, supra note 44, para. 5. 
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topic.The Commission took note of the oral report of the Chairman of the Working Group 
and endorsed that recommendation.76  
 
Evaluating the importance of the ILC work on the issue of transboundary oil and natural 
gas deposits and the contribution made by it in the international law of such resources, one 
conclusion may be firmly done. To be successful, the development of the law of 
transboundary hydrocarbon resources has to avoid a way of international generalization 
and codification. It is more reasonable for it to be derived from the bilateral cooperation 




Summarizing it can be said that attempts to adopt comprehensive legal instrument on 
shared oil and natural gas resources have failed and it is hard to believe that they will be 
remade, because of significant disagreements between states on that issue. This failure 
leads to arising of the question about customary nature of any possible pattern of behavior 
in case of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits.  
 
3.4. Managing common resources in bilateral state practice 
 
3.4.1. Possible solutions of the problem of transboundary oil and natural gas resources 
 
Analyzing relative state practice three different answers can be found on the question 
concerning the rights and the duties of the states in the case of transboundary oil and gas 
resources.77 
 
First, the prior appropriation rule is to be applied, i.e., the rule that the first to undertake 
extraction has the right to exploit the whole deposit. The application of that rule, also 
known as a rule of capture in domestic petroleum laws and adjudication, especially in the 
United States, will result in competitive drilling, and consequently, in economic and 
                                                 
76 See A/65/10, supra note 47, para. 376-384. 
77 Lagoni, supra note 48, at 219. 
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physical waste of resources. Nowadays, the domestic laws of the most states provide for 
cooperative or unitized exploitation of common petroleum deposits and therefore this rule 
can not be regarded as a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations.78 
 
Second, in the absence of an agreement on cooperation or production sharing of common 
deposits between nations, the rule of sovereignty over the subsoil applies. This solution is 
similar in its effect to the prior appropriation rule, although it worth to note that it rests not 
on the rule of capture, but on that of sovereignty. Since this rule will also result in 
competitive drilling, other special rules applicable to such deposits should be developed.79 
 
A third solution argues for cooperation in order to avoid competitive drilling, because of 
existing opinion, it is contrary to international law. For instance, it was contended that “the 
application of the principle of territorial sovereignty over the subsoil together with the 
obligation not to cause material damage to another states, and an additional obligation to 
exchange information and consult on matters concerning the common deposit, would 
sufficiently resolve the legal problems of those deposits”. Here, the crucial point is whether 
or not obligations to inform and consult about common deposits already exist in 
international law. It can be said that it does, mainly on the basis of several resolutions of 
the UN General Assembly.80 
 
Another call for cooperation is based on different grounds. It is assumed that the states 
possess joint property rights and vested interests in the common deposit and, therefore, no 
state may unilaterally exploit a common petroleum deposit. Unilateral exploitation of such 
deposits is contrary to existing international law, therefore exploitation of those deposits 
must be exercised by mutual agreement between states concerned.81 
 
It is hard to say whether there are binding rules or customs under international law 
requiring the unitization of transboundary deposits, rather states are compelled to cooperate 
for practical and economic reasons.  
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Since there is no one standard how to act in the case of transboundary resources, especially 
in the absence of an agreement, an analysis of the state practice on common deposits can 
be helpful and shed some light on the development of appropriate rules for such situations.  
 
3.4.2. Classification of cooperative agreements  
 
The majority of the state practice on the present topic consists of bilateral agreements 
between interested states. They may be divided into two groups. The first group deals with 
common deposits that have been already discovered. This type shows how states have 
actually cooperated and consists of four sub-types. The second group deals with common 
deposits that may be discovered in the future and reflects the extent and virtual uniformity 
to include some sort of “mineral deposit clause” in the delimitation agreements.82 
 
As it was just mentioned, the first type of the agreements can be divided in four groups, 
four types of cooperation. The first, so-called “geological cooperation”, have been 
mentioned in 1960 agreement between Czechoslovakia and Austria for the exploitation of 
a common deposit of natural gas in the Vysoka-Zwerndorf frontier area.83 The main 
features of such cooperation are (1) neither party has jurisdiction over a common deposit as 
a whole; (2) each party works its proportionate share in accordance with annual 
calculations. The parties must periodically exchange data about previous month’s output 
and conditions of the deposit. Summing up, this geological cooperation implies limitation 
of each party’s production by means of data exchange and periodic consultation.84 
 
The second sub-type can be found, inter alia, in the 1962 Supplementary Agreement to the 
Ems-Dollart Treaty between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany.85 It 
encourages joint operations by the concessionaires of both parties. It deals with the estuary 
of the Ems River, which has long been claimed by both countries.  The parties agreed on a 
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preliminary dividing line and each exercises jurisdiction on its side. The concessionaires of 
both sides are bound to cooperate closely with each other by concluding contracts about 
the calculation of reserves and output and about details of production or revenue sharing, 
risk bonuses, and the settlement of disputes.86 
 
The third one provides for unitized exploitation of common deposit or certain well-defined 
fields. It “calls for a single operator to manage the common deposit on behalf of all 
parties”.87 This practice can be found at both international level and in domestic mining 
legislation of several states. The main purposes are to avoid wasting of resources or 
duplicating drilling installations, wells, and producing facilities; and, talking about inter-
state cooperation, peaceful exploitation of mineral deposits, especially in areas disputed by 
two or more states.88 The good examples of such agreements are two agreements between 
Japan and South Korea,89 and Norway-UK cooperation in the North Sea.90  
 
The last, fourth kind of cooperation, is one when the parties exercise joint power over the 
mineral resources of an area. It can be characterized as a functionally limited 
condominium, and is typical for agreements have being concluded between a number of 
Middle Eastern states. The distinctive feature of it is that in this cooperation, in contrast to 
the first three types, states possess joint property rights and vested interests in the common 
field or deposit. It may be in the form of a common sovereign authority over the area itself 
or in the form of conventionally established equal sovereign rights to the natural resources 
of a certain zone.91  
 
Another bulk of agreement is those dealing with common deposits which may be 
discovered in the future. The distinctive feature of such agreements is that they contain 
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“mineral deposit clause”. The practice to include it “is striking to its uniformity”.92 The 
first clause of this type was included in an agreement between Great Britain and Norway in 
1965. It reads: 
 
Article 4 
If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field, or any single geological 
structure or field of any other mineral deposit, including sand or gravel, extends across 
the dividing line and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of 
the dividing line is exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side of the dividing 
line, the Contracting Parties shall, in consultation with the licensees, if any, seek to 
reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure or field shall be most 
effectively exploited and the manner in which the proceeds deriving therefrom shall be 
apportioned.93 
 
This article became a kind of standard for “mineral deposit clause”. There also exists 
slightly different clause, which might be called the “Iranian type”, referring only to 
deposits that can be exploited from the other side of the boundary line by “directional 
drilling”.94 
 
Regardless of type or form of the cooperative arrangement, the essential question is how to 
apportion the proceeds from the exploitation of shared resources. One way is to allocate 
benefits in proportion to the volume of deposit located respectively on either side of 
boundary. The basis for it is the principle of state’s territorial sovereignty or exclusive 
sovereign rights. Another option is the equitable share of the benefits. As opposed to first 
model, it takes under consideration not only geographical allocation of deposit, but also 
others that could be relevant as, for instance, a change in geological conditions, amount of 
minerals already extracted, the costs of exploration and exploitation, and others. And 
finally, for the areas of overlapping claims, parties mostly choose an “equal” sharing of the 
proceeds.95  
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3.4.3. Cross-Border Unitization and Joint Development Agreements 
 
Apart above mentioned classification of bilateral cooperation in case of transboundary oil 
and natural gas deposit, there are numerous others.  Cross-border unitization and joint 
development agreements, being particular examples of cooperative agreements described 
in previous subchapter,96 become the most popular kind of cooperation in recent years. 
Both of them are the special case of the wider notion “unitization”. It came from the 
United States where private ownership of minerals has often resulted in fractionalized 
ownership of the oil and gas in a common reservoir. The main purpose of it is to preserve 
unity of the deposit and to avoid competitive drilling and production with consequent 
economic and physical waste. Otherwise, each separate owner, being guided by the 
common law “rule of capture”, will “attempt to secure his or her “fair share” of the 
underground resource by drilling more and pumping faster than his neighbor”.97 Outside 
the United States, unitization wasn’t so prevalent simply because it wasn’t necessary, but 
the interest in it has been growing in the past three decades.98 The notion unitization can be 
defined as “the joint, coordinated operation of an oil or gas reservoir by all the owners of 
rights in the separate tracts overlying the reservoir or reservoirs”.99 There are several 
reasons to call it the best method of producing oil and gas efficiently and fairly. They are 
(1) avoiding the economic waste of unnecessary well drilling and construction of related 
facilities; (2) possibility to share development infrastructure; (3) maximization of the 
ultimate recovery of petroleum from a field; (4) it gives all owners of rights in the common 
reservoir a fair share of the production; (5) minimization of the surface use of the land and 
surface damages by avoiding unnecessary wells and infrastructure.100 It is also worth to 
give definitions of the special cases of unitization.  
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Cross-Border Unitization is the “unitization which takes place for a reservoir underlying 
two or more countries that have a delimited border between them. Such unitization will 
typically involve two or more different licensees”.101  
 
Joint Development Agreement for a Joint Development Zone is “an agreement between 
countries that authorizes the cooperative development of petroleum resources in a 
geographic area that has (or had) disputed sovereignty”.102 The JDA establishes 
cooperative development of petroleum regime within an area calling a joint development 
zone (JDZ). The JDZ is generally a temporary solution, without prejudice to subsequent 
delimitation, but it also can be permanent one. An establishment of JDZ also may be a part 
of delimitation agreement, where the boundary has been defined.103 It can happen that 
deposit crossing the boundary between JDZ and the defined border of another country. 
Here, the possible solution is cross-border unitization agreement between the body 
managing JDZ and the state that exercises sovereign rights over the other part of the 
reservoir.104 
 
The main difference between these two types of unitization arises from their definitions. 
Cross-border unitization is applied in case of defined boundary, while joint development is 
for not delimited areas. The other basic differences between cross-border unitization and 
JDA include the following: (1) a cross-border unitization is required after discovery is 
made, while a JDA is ideally formed before any exploration occurs; (2) a cross-border 
unitization regulates defined individual reservoir or field, but the JDA deals with the area 
of disputed jurisdiction, which is generally larger than any individual reservoir or field; (3) 
In a cross-border unitization, the licensees prepare a single development plan and a unit 
operating agreement that is subject to the approval of the involved countries. In a JDA, a 
single body which has the authority to develop its own regulations, create fiscal terms, and 
manage the jointly shared jurisdiction is commonly established; (4) The benefits and costs 
is divided on the proportionate share (called the participation factor) of the field’s for a 
cross-border unitization, and on a pre-defined basis (usually, but not always, on a fifty-fifty 
basis) for the JDA.105 
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Existing cross-border unitization agreements and JDA show a wide variation in structure. 
It is possible to identify six major issues as being particularly important for any JDA. It can 
be safely said that they are also pertain to cross-border unitization agreements. They are (1) 
sharing of resources, (2) management structure, (3) applicable law, (4) operator and 
position of contractors, (5) financial provisions, and (6) dispute resolution. The sharing of 
resources is the core element of the agreement. It defines proportion of the resources 
allocated to each state. The management structure provides a satisfactory basis for the 
protection of the rights and obligations of both states. It is possible to outline three 
categories of management structure for the JDA: (1) Single state model, when one state 
managing on behalf of both states; (2) two states/join venture model; and, (3) joint 
authority model. The applicable law is the legal system that will regulate proceeding of the 
cooperation. The necessity of it is obvious since all parties have its own legal system, 
which will very likely be significantly different from each other. The ”operator and 
position of contractors” means that the agreement will either specify the basis for licensing 
or will designate to some body (Joint Authority) the obligation to develop the rules for 
selecting contractors. The financial provisions establishes taxation regime applicable to 
operations and activities. The dispute resolution mechanism usually involves internal 




Summarizing state practice on the issue of transboundary resources, it can be firmly said 
that states seeking solution of the problem look for cooperation during negations on 
delimitation or when it is strongly believed that such resources can be found in the area 
where a border is already established. States have a number of possible models of 
cooperation, but the cross-border unitization and joint development for JDZ becoming 
more and more popular nowadays, seem to be most reasonable and widely accepted 
models. 
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3.5. International case law regarding delimitation disputes 
 
In the above mentioned North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ did not consider the 
unity of a deposit as a “special circumstance” for drawing final boundary, but to be taken 
into consideration in the delimitation process.107 Yet at early stages of the process, the 
Court recognized the need to preserve the unity of the deposit for the economical and 
efficient exploitation of petroleum resources.108 Two recently concluded treaties for the 
regulation of transboundary resources in a then not delimited area, have been regarded by 
the ICJ as being “particularly appropriate when it is a question of preserving the unity of 
deposit” in areas of overlapping, but equally justifiable claims.109 It was also noted that the 
principle of joint exploitation might have a wider application in agreement dealing with 
overlapping continental shelf, that is, yet to be delimited, especially in case when states 
have equally justifiable claims.110 Taking into consideration UK – Norway Continental 
Shelf Agreement of 1965 and the Supplementary Agreement to the Ems-Dollart Treaty, the 
Court noted:  
To look no farther than the North Sea, the practice of States shows how this problem 
has been dealt with, and all that is needed is to refer to the undertakings entered into by 
the coastal States of that sea with a view to ensuring the most efficient exploitation or 
the apportionment of the products extracted.111 
 
These Court’s statements were argued to be obiter dictum. Thus they cannot be considered 
as more than an endorsement of such arrangements. But regarding cross-border unitization 
and joint development they can serve to “aid the identification of rules created by States” 
and contribute to establishing “the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations”.112  
 
The other call for cooperation is the recommendation of the Conciliation Commission on 
the Continental Shelf Area between Iceland and Jan Mayen. The Commission 
recommended establishing of joint development arrangement for the area where any 
significant prospect of hydrocarbon production exist. It is worth to note that the 
                                                 
107 Ong, David M. Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits:”Mere” State Practice or 
Customary International Law? In: American Journal of International Law. Vol. 93(1999) pp. 771-804, at 
785. 
108 Bastida et. al., supra note 81, at  382. 
109 Ibid., at 383 (citing North Sea cases, supra note 4, at 52). 
110 Ibid., at 383-384 (referring North Sea cases, supra note 4, at 66-67 (separate opinion of Judge Jessup)). 
111 North Sea cases, supra note 4, para 97. 
112 Ong, supra note 107, at 785. 
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Commission favored joint development rather than the mere establishing of maritime 
boundary.113 Although these recommendations were not binding on Iceland and Norway, 
this approach was adopted. The Agreement on Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan 
Mayen of 1981114 established detailed JDZ and provided for unitization if cross-border 
deposit was discovered either across delimitation line or across the boundary of the 
southern part of the JDZ.115 It is obviously that the Commission, as well as the ICJ in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, recognized the importance of unitization for the most 
effective economic recovery.116  
 
Another example is the 1982 Continental Shelf case between Tunisia and Libya.117 
Following the ICJ’s decision on that case the parties settled maritime boundary dispute 
amicably, designated joint exploration zone in the Gulf of Gabes area, and established 
Joint Libyan-Tunisian exploration company.  
 
In seabed dispute between Australia and Indonesia parties also established three-part Zone 
of Cooperation.118 In Eritrea/Yemen Case119 Tribunal gave parties two possibilities: equal 
division of overlapping areas or agreement of joint exploitation; and stressed that the latter 
solution appears appropriate taking in consideration question of preserving unity of a 
deposit.120 
 
Summarizing presented examples it can be easily said that judicial statements on 
delimitation issues mostly call for cooperation between interested parties and those that 
suggest cooperation in the form of joint development arrangement for the overlapping area, 
may serve as a legally viable alternative to the usual methods of delimitation.  
 
 
                                                 
113 Ibid., at 786. 
114 Agreement Between Norway and Iceland on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen. Oslo, 
22 October 1981. 2124 UNTS 247. 
115 Bastida et. al., supra note 81, at  385. 
116 Ibid., at 385. 
117 Continental Shelf  case (Tunisia/Lybyan Arab Jamahiriya), ICJ Reports 1982, p.18. 
118 Bastida et. al., supra note 81, at  391 
119 Eritrea vs. Yemen (Perm. Ct. Arb., 1999). http://pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EY%20Phase%20II.PDF 
120 Bastida et. al., supra note 81, at  391 
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3.6. Conclusion  
 
The present analysis of different sources of international law shows that, firstly, that 
regulation of transboundary resources at international level calls for cooperation, but 
dealing with hydrocarbons in particular international institutes working on this issue tried 
to avoid this topic at all or at least avoid precise formulation of states’ rights and 
obligations, with a view not to be rejected by the majority of the states.  Secondly, state 
practice shows that states mostly choose the way of cooperation during negations on 
delimitation or when it is strongly believed that such resources can be found in the area 
where a border is already established. It can also be said that states are compelled to 
cooperate due to economical and ecological reasons. Thirdly, the judgments in delimitation 
disputes also call for cooperation for the purpose of preserving of deposit’s unity and to 







4. OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The core element of the present analysis is the cooperation with regard to transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposit. The key question is whether there is an obligation under customary 
international law to cooperate in case of petroleum deposit crossing border or locating in 
disputed area. This question may be divided in two. First, has the obligation to cooperate 
become an international custom and, second, shall this cooperation be in form of cross-
border unitization or joint development agreement. The general obligation to cooperate is 
considered by legal experts containing two elements: (1) duty to inform and consult; and, 
(2) duty to negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement. Regarding second element it is 
worth to note that parties are not obliged to reach a successful conclusion.  
 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines international custom 
as “evidence of general practice accepted as law”. This definition distinguishes two 
constituent elements of international custom: general practice and acceptance of this 
practice as law by international law subjects, opinio juris sive necessitates. 
 
To answer the question “Does the rule to cooperate contain both elements?” it is necessary 
to analyze all sources of international law related to the present question.   
 
For the first, UN LOSC will be considered as source of the international law, although it is 
hard to argue that it regulate transboundary mineral resources. In the case when there are 
no multilateral conventions or clear rules of customary international law on an issue, the 
legal basis for such an obligation requires analysis of the less authoritative, but 
nevertheless important, secondary sources of international law. Such as, General Assembly 
resolutions and other UN instruments, international case law and the writings of the 





4.2. Obligation to cooperate at international level 
4.2.1. Provisions of the UN LOS Convention calling for cooperation 
 
The UN LOS Convention explicitly mentions arrangements similar to the JDA for the case 
of overlapping claims within the continental shelf or EEZ. Articles 74 (3) and 83(3) state: 
“the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort 
to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional 
period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements 
shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation”.121 Significantly, the language used 
here is similar to that used in “mineral deposit clauses” in many delimitation agreements. 
Only, the latter find place in undisputed area and belongs to a group of the cross-border 
unitization agreements, while the former definitely belongs to the JDA.  Although these 
articles provide an obligation to cooperate, it is just a general one and the exact nature of 
the provisional arrangements is unspecified.122 
 
Another provision of LOS Convention calling to cooperate is article 123, dealing with 
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. It states: “States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed 
sea should co-operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance 
of their duties”.123 This provision is relevant both to JDA regarding semi-enclosed seas, 
e.g. Malaysia – Thailand, Malaysia – Vietnam and Indonesia – Australia agreements on the 
South China Sea and the Timor Sea, and to cross-border unitization agreements also 
related to semi-enclosed seas, e.g. the United Kingdom – Norway and the United Kingdom 
– the Netherlands on the North Sea. Similar examples can be found in the Persian Gulf.124 
 
The question arises whether this general requirement to cooperate applies to transboundary 
hydrocarbons found in such seas. Two facts leave some doubts. First, the wording of the 
article does not contain any specific and legally enforceable obligation; it is more 
exhortatory than obligatory. Second, the article specifies some objects it deals with. They 
are living resources of the sea, marine environment, and scientific research. It is hard to 
find place among them for hydrocarbon or another nonliving resources. Nevertheless, it is 
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argued that it goes beyond a mere recommendation and constitutes a legal obligation, and 
even if it does not apply directly to nonliving resources it serves as a useful analogy.125 
 
Article 142 of the LOS Convention regulates “activities in the Area, with respect to 
resource deposits in the Area which lie across limits of national jurisdiction”.126 Such 
activities “shall be conducted with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any 
coastal State across whose jurisdiction such deposits lie”.127 Moreover, it provides a system 
of prior notification and consultations, and requires the prior consent of the coastal State if 
such activities may result in the exploitation of resources lying within national 
jurisdiction.128 These requirements can arguably be ascribed to neighboring coastal states 
in analogous situation and form a basis for cross-border unitization or JDA regime between 
them.  
 
And again it is worth to mention the UN Fish Stock Agreement, expressly supporting 
cooperation on utilization of transboundary resources. Article 5 of the Agreement stating 
“in giving effect to their duty to cooperate in accordance with the Convention”,129 clearly 
implies that cooperation is more than just recommendation, though it concerns only marine 
living resources.  
 
4.2.2. UN General Assembly resolutions 
 
Certain UNGA resolutions, in particular, adopted by overwhelming majority of the 
member states, have a more obligatory quality than others and indicate the willingness of 
the international community to be guided by the principles they embody.130  
 
Talking about UNGA resolutions on the present issue, some experts mentions the failure of 
the 1972 Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment to accept the general 
principle  of cooperation between states sharing natural resources (of all kind, not only of 
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common deposits of liquid minerals).131 Soon after that, in December 1973, UNGA 
adopted Resolution 3129, which states: “it is necessary to ensure effective co-operation 
between countries through the establishment of adequate international standards for the 
conservation and harmonious exploitation of natural resources common to two or more 
States in the context of the normal relations existing between them”.132 Although the 
voting, (77 in favor, 5 against (mostly Latin America states), and 43 abstentions 
(industrialized states)), leaves some doubt whether it may be considered as a general opinio 
juris, it, anyway, may be regarded as an indication of growing understanding of the need 
for legal obligations in respect of such resources.133  
 
Supporting that, UN GA adopted in 1974 the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States. Article 3 of that reads: “In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or 
more countries, each State must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and 
prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing 
damage to the legitimate interest of others”.134  
 
Following the just mentioned Resolution 3129, UN Environmental Program drafted 
principles for the guidance of States with respect to conservation and harmonious 
utilization of natural resources shared by two or more States.135 These principles 
“encouraged states sharing natural resources to cooperate in the equitable utilization of 
shared natural resources as well as to avoid, to the maximum extend possible, the adverse 
environmental effect of such utilization”.136 
 
Summing up, it is worth to note that although UNGA resolutions do not create any 
obligations of a legal character, they indicate the willingness of the international 
community to be guided by the principles they embody. 
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4.3. Bilateral state practice of cooperation in managing of transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposits 
4.3.1. Classification of unitization arrangements 
 
Numerous bilateral unitization agreements have proved that joint development and cross-
border unitization is an effective option for cooperation in the exploration and exploitation 
of common natural resources. There are different models of unitization, but none of them 
predominates in numerical forms alone. It is possible to outline three basic models of them.  
 
The first model is the simplest and oldest one. According to this model one state manages 
whole development of the deposits located in disputed area on behalf of both states. The 
other state shares benefits from the exploitation after the firs state’s costs are deducted. 
Nowadays this model is not widely used as it was at the earlier stages of unitization 
concept development, mostly because of the unacceptable loss of autonomy by the state 
which sovereign rights are delegated to other state. Hardly any states would like to put 
itself in such a position, especially when it involves not delimited continental shelf.137 
Examples of this model include the 1958 Saudi Arabia-Bahrain and the 1969 Abu Dhabi-
Qatar Agreements. 
 
The next model is a joint development agreement establishing a system of compulsory 
joint ventures between the interested states and their national oil companies in designated 
JDZ.138 The best example of such unitization cooperation is the 1974 Agreement between 
Japan and the Republic of (South) Korea. Other examples are the 1992 Memorandum of 
Understanding between Malaysia and Vietnam the 1995 Joint Declaration by Argentina 
and the United Kingdom. 
 
The third unitization option is the most complex and institutionalized one. It requires a 
much higher level of cooperation. Under this model an international joint authority or 
commission with legal personality, licensing and regulatory powers to be established.139 It 
should have a comprehensive mandate to manage the development of the JDZ on behalf of 
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all states involved.140 Examples of this type unitization are the Malaysia-Thailand Joint 
Development Agreements of 1979-1990 and the Guinea-Bissau-Senegal Agreement of 
1993 and its 1995 Protocol.  
 
4.3.2. Cross-border unitization agreements in the States practice 
 
Some good examples of cross-border unitization agreements can be found in the North 
Sea. These unitization agreements got their legal force from the already mentioned 1965 
delimitation agreement between the United Kingdom and Norway, which was the first one 
containing, so called, “mineral deposit clause” and agreement between the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands of the same year. The first of them is the 1976 Frigg 
Agreement. It “placed the unitization of the field on the level of public international 
law”.141 The basic feature of that agreement is concept of exploitation of the reservoirs as a 
single unit. The Agreement allocated benefits and costs between states in accordance with 
portion of the deposit lying within jurisdiction of each state. Two others agreements 
between the UK and Norway, for the Murchison and Statfjord fields, both signed in 1979, 
were largely based on the Frigg Agreement.  Aiming to avoid necessity for a field-specific 
treaty for every cross-border unitization and to facilitate other aspects of cross-border 
cooperation, the UK and Norway signed a Framework Agreement in 2005.142 It provides 
basis for subsequent cross-border unitizations, and already two fields, Blane and Enoch, 
have been unitized under this agreement.143 And the fourth cross-border unitization 
agreement is that between the UK and the Netherlands, unitizing Markham field, signed in 
1992. 
 
There are also cross-border unitization agreements in other parts of the world, for instance, 
the 2003 International Unitization Agreement between Australia and Timor-Leste covering 
the Sunrise and Troubadour fields.  
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The delimitation agreement between Russia and Norway144 is the most recent example of 
such agreement containing “mineral deposit clause” and calling for cooperation on 
exploitation of transboundary deposits. It requires unitization agreement to be reached.145 
According present classification, since border between states is already established, it will 
be cross-border unitization agreement. The distinctive feature of the Agreement is that 
besides Article 5, concerning hydrocarbon resources and containing “mineral deposit 
clause”, it devotes a whole annex to prescribing main elements of a unitization agreement 
and procedure of a settlement of disputes in case of disagreements.146 This annex contains 
no fundamentally novel provisions, prescribing procedure that more or less repeats well 
established standard of such unitization agreements. As others agreements calling for 
cooperation, it also requires fulfillment of duty to consult and exchange information, and to 
negotiate in good faith. Although it prescribes nothing new for the regime of common 
deposits, the annex itself plays important role in the dispute about whether cooperation is 
already a customary obligation, weighting scale on behalf of arguments “for”. It also 
shows that not only cooperation is required, but also that unitization agreement is a well-
established practice.  
 
4.3.3. Joint development agreements in the States practice 
 
In 1974 Japan and Republic of Korea (South Korea) concluded joint development 
agreement for the part of East China Sea which was an object of overlapping claims not 
only of these states, but also of North Korea and China. This agreement established JDZ 
divided into subzones with two concessionaires for every subzone, one authorized by each 
state. One of the concessionaries became operator and the state authorized that 
concessionary set laws and regulations to be applicable in that subzone. The Joint 
Commission was also established to act as a consultative body for the purpose of liaison 
between two states.147  
 
In 1974 Saudi Arabia and Sudan signed agreement creating a JDZ in the central part of the 
Red Sea. This agreement provides for equal and exclusive sovereign rights for both states 
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in all the natural resources. The Joint Commission was also established. It acts as a 
corporate body with legal capacity to carry out all its assigned functions in both states.148 
 
In 1979 Malaysia and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding which established 
a JDZ in the Gulf of Thailand. The memorandum established a powerful Joint Authority. It 
was given all the rights and responsibilities on behalf of both sates for the exploration and 
exploitation of non-living resources in the JDZ.149  
 
The similar to Malaysia-Thailand’s joint authority is the Joint Authority established by 
Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia, signed in 1989. That Treaty is 
considered to be one of the most comprehensive joint development agreements. It 
established a Zone of Cooperation divided into three areas. Area A being under joint 
control was managed by a Ministerial Council and a Joint Authority, with equal 
representation by each state and equal sharing of the resources. In Areas B and C each 
state, Australia and Indonesia respectively, retained exclusive sovereign rights subject to 
notifications and remittance of ten percent of income tax to other party.150 
 
In 1993 Guinea-Bissau and Senegal established a JDZ beyond their territorial sea within a 
designated area around Cape Roxo. In contrast to most of the joint development 
agreements this one has some special features. First, it serves the dual purpose to regulate 
exploitation not only petroleum and other non-living resources, but fishery resources as 
well. Another distinctive feature is allocation of proceeds. The fishery resources are to be 
shared equally, like it is done in the majority of JDA for hydrocarbons, but the petroleum 
and minerals are split 85:15, for Senegal and Guinea-Bissau respectively.  Agreement 
established joint authority, called Agency for Management and Cooperation of the JDZ, 
which, with regard to petroleum activities, was required to carry out all relevant petroleum 
operations or make arrangements to have them carried out. 151 
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Summarizing, it can be firmly said that both types of unitization is an effective option for 
cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of common natural resources, and, 
probably, the best at the moment. But although the practice of unitization is considerable, 
there is no only model of it being universally accepted due to different political and 
economic systems, traditions of conflict and degrees of national sensitivity. 
 
4.4. Judgments calling for cooperation in international case law 
 
Basic judgments on cases related to transboundary hydrocarbon resources were widely 
considered in chapter III above. It is worth just to repeat that presented examples show that 
judicial statements on delimitation issues mostly call for cooperation between interested 
parties. They clearly show that some international jurists favor and support cooperative 
actions. 
 
4.5. Obligation of good faith 
 
The duty to negotiate in good faith is considered by some legal experts as an integral part 
of the general obligation to cooperate.  
 
This rule of good faith is widely recognized as a general principle well-founded in 
international law. As examples, article 33(1) of UN Charter and article 300 of LOS 
Convention can be given.  
 
In Lac Lanoux arbitration152 violations of the rule of good faith is to include “an unjustified 
breaking off of the discussions, abnormal delays, disregard of agreed procedures, 
systematic refusals to take into consideration adverse proposals or interests”. Hence, any 
prejudicial or wasteful exploration or exploitation of common deposits must be regarded as 
being contrary to good faith.153 
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In the proof of this duty, it is worth to mention well-established precedents, such as the 
Tacna Arica arbitration, the case of the Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, 154 
and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.155 In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for 
instance, the rule of good faith is met by application of the so-called equitable principle.156  
 
4.6. Obligation of mutual restraint 
 
Besides positive obligation to cooperate, there also can be distinguished negative 
obligation of mutual restraint. The mutual restraint obligation may be followed in the case 
of disagreement over the development of the transboundary resources. It means “that if one 
interested state refuses to agree with the other in the exploitation of a common deposit, it 
will have practically a veto power over the other state or states that propose common 
development of the shared resources”.157 This concept has received much doctrinal 
support. This is also supported by Article 83(3) of UN LOS Convention, which provides 
that states concerned “…shall make every effort […] not to jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of the final agreement”.158 “This provision has been interpreted to mean that 
states are obliged to refrain from unilateral action when it risks depriving other states of the 
gains they might realize by exercising their sovereign right of exploitation”.159 This is also 
supported by the fact that unilateral exploitation of transboundary deposits, affecting the 
rights of other states concerned, violates customary rule not to cause significant and 
irreversible harm to other states, and is actually prohibited under international law.160  
 
While the positive obligation to cooperate can be disputed to be an international custom, 
the negative obligation arguably requires less consistency to become established custom.161 
Therefore it can firmly said that obligation of mutual restraint is already exist as a part of 
international customary law. 
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The stalemate situation may occur if one of states obliged to cooperate refuses to negotiate 
in finding common solution. In this case state initiating negotiations is not allowed to 
exercise their lawful rights over natural resources effectively and without undue 
interference, that is provided for by the principle of effectiveness under international 
law.162 Some commentators argue that such situation may be averted by the argument that 
a stale refusing to negotiate forfeits the ability to hold another state responsible for 
violation of it sovereign rights. Another suggested that this negative obligation should be 
coupled with mentioned positive one.163 This suggestion makes a contribution to conclude 
that the positive obligation is an international custom as well as negative. 
 
4.7. Conclusion   
 
Considering obligations to cooperate in general and that to cooperate in the form of 
unitization as a rules of international customary law, it can be firmly said that first 
requirement, settled state practice, is definitely fulfilled. Considerable number of coastal 
states with opposite or adjacent continental shelves have chosen a cooperation for 
managing transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. Not only increasing numbers, but also their 
geographical diversity refutes any attempt to dismiss their repeated occurrence as merely 
coincidental. Assessing state practice, it has to be taken into consideration that the practice 
of so called specially affected states contributes significantly to the formation of any rule 
of customary international law. The judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for 
instance, underlies the role of the practice of the specially affected states. The ratio of 
delimitation agreements prescribing unitization of common deposits to all types of 
maritime delimitation agreements is relatively low. But if consider how often 
transboundary resources had been detected or they had been supposed to be detected 
during negations of delimitation agreement, then presumably higher ratio will be obtained, 
supporting existence of consistent practice.164 
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Thus, arguing non-customary character of both obligations, it is nothing to say about 
noncompliance of first requirement, rather it can be argued on the base of the lack of the 
psychological or subjective element of acceptance of the obligations as binding in law, 
namely opinio juris.  
 
Considering fulfillment of second requirement to become an international custom it is 
better to consider these two obligations in question separately.  
 
Extensive number of international law sources of different levels can be cited in support of 
a general obligation to cooperate. On international level they are UN GA resolutions, 
including those by which the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and UNEP 
Principles were adopted, and, of course, articles 74 and 83 of LOS Convention compelling 
states, in case of delimitation dispute, to “make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature”. It is obvious that state consider them as the sources of 
binding obligation. The binding nature of that obligation is also confirmed by bilateral state 
practice to include “mineral deposit clause” in delimitation agreements and entering in 
cooperative arrangements to preserve unity of deposit and avoid competition in exploration 
and exploitation of common deposit. There hardly can be found any case of application of 
the rule of capture. Even if so, then it is rather violation of existing norms, than one of the 
possible ways to resolve problem of common deposit. From the level of international case 
law the separate opinion of Judge Jessup in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases can be 
given as an example, where he notes that the principle of international cooperation is well 
established under customary international law.165  
 
Although unitization practice in form of cross-border unitization and joint development for 
JDZ is extensive, there are no considerable evidences that cooperation in form of 
unitization is obligatory under international customary law. Perhaps, unitization obligation 
can be regarded as an established custom in domestic legislation of the United States where 
it is originated from, but not at international level. Several international cases decided 
before the ICJ indicate that regime of joint development and JDZ are strongly 
recommended, but, nevertheless, both unitization options are just among several possible 
legal outcomes.  One more fact that weights the scale on behalf of arguments “against” is 
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that although the practice of unitization is considerable, there is no only model of it being 
universally accepted due to different political and economic systems, traditions of conflict 
and degrees of national sensitivity.166  Moreover, the general obligation to cooperate 
implies that interested states are obliged to negotiate, but not to reach a successful 
conclusion. However, while there is yet no obligation to cooperate in any form of 
unitization, a trend towards it obviously exists. The law and practice of cross-border 
unitization and joint development continues to evolve, and probably in the near future 
would be crystallized in international customary law.  
 
Summing up present analysis about whether general and specific obligations to cooperate 
are already a part of international customary law following conclusion may be made. The 
general obligation to cooperate is well-established international custom, including an 
obligation to cooperate in reaching agreement on the exploration and exploitation of 
transboundary deposits, and an obligation to exercise mutual restraint with respect to 
unilateral exploitation of deposits in case when agreement is not reached. Unitization 
options themselves, however, is not specifically required by international law and represent 
possible legal outcomes.  
 
                                                 








Two questions have been considered in the present paper: (1) What pattern of behavior is 
prescribed for neighboring states in managing of transboundary oil and natural gas 
resources on a continental shelf? (2) Does obligation to cooperate in managing 
transboundary hydrocarbon resources already crystallized in international customary law. 
The latter question arises because all attempts to adopt international legal instrument 
regulating exploration and exploitation of such resources have failed. It is divided into two 
sub-questions dealing with general obligation to cooperate in managing common 
hydrocarbons, and with particular obligation to cooperate in the form of unitization.  
 
Seeking answer on the first question legal sources of international law in accordance with 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ were considered. Concerning the highest level of legal 
source, international conventions etc., the ILC’s work on the topic “Shared natural 
resources” regarding oil and gas resources and the attempts of negotiating parties at 
UNCLOS III to include some provisions regulating mineral resources of transboundary 
nature on continental shelf in UN LOS Convention are worth to be mentioned. But both, 
ILC and UNCLOS III, have failed in their attempts, due to significant differences in states’ 
positions on this issue. Bilateral state practice has been more successful in that and it can 
be firmly stated now that cooperation in the field of transboundary mineral resources in 
general, and hydrocarbons in particular, is well-established and widely recognized state 
practice. A huge number of bilateral agreements, mostly delimitation ones, having 
cooperative nature, supports this point. International courts’ decisions also support 
preserving unity of transboundary deposits and a peaceful solution of the problem of their 
exploitation. Concluding, it can be said that although there is still no international legal 
instrument regulating the present issue, states have chosen cooperation as a best way of 
resource management. Saying that states have chosen cooperation, it rather means they are 
compelled to cooperate due to economical and ecological reasons. Choosing cooperation 




On the second question, first of all, the obligation to cooperate has been divided into two 
sub-questions, dealing with general and particular obligation to cooperate. Then the legal 
sources of international law were considered as well as in the research on the first question. 
The main purpose of this analysis was to find evidences of the fulfillment of two 
requirements imposed to any rule to be regarded as an international custom. Increasing 
numbers and geographical diversity of cooperation in general, and unitization practice in 
particular, clearly show that the first requirement, settled state practice, is obviously 
fulfilled.  Regarding the second requirement, opinion juris, the position of these 
obligations is different. While general obligation, namely its two elements, duty to inform 
and consult and duty to negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement, is widely accepted 
as binding in law, the specific obligation doesn’t seem to be recognized at the same degree. 
Although practice of cooperation in the form of unitization is considerable, it is still just 
among several possible legal outcomes. And the absence of the only model of unitization, 
due to different political and economic systems, traditions of conflict and degrees of 
national sensitivity, supports non-recognition of this obligation as a customary law.  
 
Summing up present analysis it can be concluded that the general obligation to cooperate, 
being dual and including an obligation to cooperate in reaching agreement on the 
exploration and exploitation of transboundary deposits, and an obligation to exercise 
mutual restraint with respect to unilateral exploitation of deposits in case when agreement 
is not reached, is well-established international custom. Regarding cross-border unitization 
and joint development, the conclusion is that unitization is not specifically required by 
international law and represents possible legal outcomes. However, while there is yet no 
obligation to cooperate in any form of unitization, a trend towards it obviously exists. The 
law and practice of cross-border unitization and joint development continues to evolve, and 
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